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This paper presents consideration of two public pension systems
having a De¯ned Contribution (DC) or a De¯ned Bene¯t (DB) structure
and presents an examination of how the pension policy a®ects the fertility
and income growth in an endogenous fertility model. DC bene¯ts for
older people change according to a budget under a constant contribution
rate by younger people. However, DB entails a contribution rate that
changes based on the maintenance of a balanced budget, providing
constant bene¯ts for older people. In both a small economy and a
closed economy, the dynamics of the fertility is not brought about by
DC, but by DB. However, the level of pension bene¯t has the same
e®ect on fertility and income growth at both DC and DB at the steady
state, not a transitional path.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents derivation of how fertility and income growth are
determined under di®erent pension systems. This paper presents consid-
eration of pension systems of two types: De¯ned Contribution (DC) and
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De¯ned Bene¯t (DB). The pension system a®ects fertility through the
household disposable income. The pension bene¯t increases the income
during the old period. However, the contribution rate for pensions de-
creases the income received during the young period.
Actually, DC bene¯ts for older people change according to a budget
under a constant rate of contributions by younger people. Some related
studies have examined endogenous fertility models in DC pensions: van
Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003), van Groezen and Meijdam (2008),
Yasuoka and Goto (2011), and Yasuoka and Goto (2015). In addition to ef-
fects of DC pensions on fertility, Wigger (1999) shows how the contribution
rate a®ects income growth.
By contrast, some researchers have examined ¯xed bene¯t pensions such
as DB: Oshio and Yasuoka (2009) and Lin and Tian (2003). In a DB
pension, the contribution rate continues increasing in a society with fewer
children because the pension bene¯t must be a constant level in the DB
pension. In a society with fewer children, the DB pension can not be
maintained without a child allowance. In the DB pension setting, the
e®ect of pension reform that is ¯nanced by a consumption tax on the
income growth is examined.1)
The di®erence between DC and DB is the component that is changed
to hold the balanced budget of a pension: the contribution rate or the
replacement ratio. Whereas DB changes the contribution rate, DC changes
the replacement ratio. If one considers public debt, then no balanced
budget of a pension need be set. This model is presented by Ono (2003).
1) We notify how the children are considered in the endogenous fertility model: con-
sumption goods and investment goods. In Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Zhang
and Zhang (1998), Lin and Tian (2003) and others, the endogenous fertility model
incorporates investment goods. By contrast, van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam
(2003), Fanti and Gori (2009), Oshio and Yasuoka (2009) and others set the model
with consumption goods.
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Considering the pension system in terms of uncertainty is important.
Th¿gerson (1998) sets a model with wage uncertainty and demonstrates
that a public pension system is better than the private pension system.
Borgmann (2005) sets a model with income and population growth uncer-
tainty and demonstrates which pension system (DC or DB) is the more
desirable in terms of social welfare.
The analyses put forward in this paper can derive the following results.
In a DC pension system, no dynamics of fertility occurs. In contrast, in
a DB pension system, dynamics of fertility occur. Therefore, if fertility
is low, it continues to decrease. The pension bene¯t eventually becomes
unsustainable in DB. This result is derived in a small open economy. How-
ever, even if one considers a closed economy, the result does not change.
In the steady state, no di®erence exists between DC and DB in examining
the e®ects of the pension on endogenous fertility and income growth.
This paper gives important policy implications. In Japan, the public
pension was reformed at 2004. Before the reform, the pension was funda-
mentally DB: the pension bene¯t is ¯xed. However, because children have
become fewer, the pension system has changed to DC with the contribution
rate ¯xed. The analyses presented in this paper demonstrate that even if
children decrease in the future, the pension system can be maintained.
The remainder of this paper is the following. Section 2 of this paper
establishes the model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium in the small open
economy. Section 4 derives the equilibrium in the closed economy. The
¯nal section presents results.
2 The Model
This model economy consists of a two-period (young and old) overlap-
ping generations model. This model has three agents: households, ¯rms,
and a government.
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2.1 Households
Each household lives in two periods, young and old, and supplies labor
during the young period to gain income. This model economy assumes that
some child-care service is necessary to rear children. The lifetime budget
constraint is given as
ztnt + c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= (1¡ ¿t)wt + pt+1
1 + rt+1
: (1)
Therein, nt represents the number of children; zt denotes the price for car-
ing for a child as child care service.2) In addition, c1t and c2t+1 respectively
signify consumption in young and old periods. Here, wt shows the wage
rate. Interest rate 1 + rt+1 represents the return to savings. Younger peo-
ple face contribution rate ¿t for the pension system. Older people receive
pension bene¯t pt+1.
A household's utility function is assumed as
ut = ® lnnt+¯ ln c1t+(1¡®¡¯) ln c2t+1; 0<®<1; 0<¯<1; ®+¯<1:
(2)
This function form is generally used in the endogenous fertility model.3)
Under budget constraint (1) in the model of child care service, house-
holds decide the allocations of c1t, c2t+1, and nt to maximize their utility
as
c1t = ¯

(1¡ ¿t)wt + pt+1
1 + rt+1

; (3)
c2t+1 = (1¡ ®¡ ¯)(1 + rt+1)

(1¡ ¿t)wt + pt+1
1 + rt+1

; (4)
nt =
®

(1¡ ¿t)wt + pt+11+rt+1

zt
: (5)
2) This paper assumes the child care provided as the goods and service. On the other
hand, some papers assume the child care time to have the children as Galor and
Weil (1996), de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and others.
3) This utility form is used by van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003) and others.
This is the conventional form in an endogenous fertility model with consumption
goods.
| 44 |
Yasuoka：Endogenous Fertility and Pension System
2.2 Firms
A representative ¯rm produces ¯nal good Yt with constant returns to
scale or a neoclassical product function, as shown by
Yt = F (Kt; AtLt); FK > 0; FL > 0; FKK < 0; FLL < 0: (6)
The ¯rm inputs capital stock Kt and labor Lt. Also, At denotes labor
productivity; At is assumed as set to unity. With a perfectly competitive
market, wage rate wt and interest rate rt are shown as
wt = f(kt)¡ f 0(kt)kt; (7)
1 + rt = f
0(kt): (8)
In those equations, kt ´ KtLt and f(kt) ´
Yt
Lt
. The capital stock depreciates
fully in one period.
This model includes a child care service sector. Based on Yasuoka and
Miyake (2010), we assume Y ct = ½L
c
t as the child care service production
function (0 < ½). Here, Y ct and L
c
t respectively denote the outputs of child
care service and the labor input for child care service sector. Assuming
free labor mobility between the ¯nal goods sector and child care service
sector, the pro¯t function ¼t is
¼t = zt½L
c
t ¡ wtLct : (9)
Then, pro¯t maximization derives the price of child care service as
zt =
wt
½
: (10)
2.3 Government
The government supplies the policy of pay-as-you-go pensions. We con-
sider pension systems of two types: DC and DB.
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De¯ned Contribution: DC This pension system ¯xes the contribution
rate for younger people (¿t = ¹¿) and determines the bene¯t level for older
people, which depends on the intergenerational population ratio, to hold a
balanced budget. Considering the balanced budget, the budget constraint
can be expressed as
Ntpt+1 = ¹¿Nt+1wt+1 $ pt+1 = ¹¿ntwt+1: (11)
In that equation, Nt and Nt+1 respectively denote the population size of
older people in t + 1 period (younger people in t period) and that of the
younger people in the t+1 period. The intergenerational population ratio
is given as nt =
Nt+1
Nt
. Large nt, which represents the intergenerational
population ratio, increases the bene¯t for older people.
De¯ned Bene¯t: DB This pension system ¯xes the bene¯t level for
older people (pt+1 = ¹pwt+1) and determines the contribution rate for
younger people. Considering a balanced budget, the budget constraint
is
Nt¹pwt+1 = ¿t+1Nt+1wt+1 $ ¿t+1 = ¹p
nt
: (12)
With a large population of younger people, the contribution rate is low.
3 Equilibrium in Small Open Economy
Next we present derivation of the equilibrium for a small open economy.
The interest rate is given by an exogenous interest rate r; the wage rate w
is also decided exogenously. We explain the equilibrium of DC and BC.
3.1 DC Case
Considering (5), (10), and (11), fertility nt can be obtained as
nt =
®(1¡ ¹¿)
1
½
¡ ®¹¿
1+r
: (13)
Here, 1
½
> ®¹¿
1+r
should be held to be positive nt. There is no dynamics of
nt.
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3.2 DB Case
Considering (5), (10), and (12), we can obtain fertility nt as
nt = ®½

1 +
¹p
1 + r
¡ ¹p
nt¡1

: (14)
For given nt¡1, fertility in t period nt is derived. The fertility dynamics of
(14) can be portrayed as the ¯gure below.
Fig. 1: Dynamics of nt .
The solid line has two steady state equilibria: one for the stable steady
state equilibrium and the other for the unstable one. The dashed line has
no steady state. With ®½

1 + ¹p
1+r
2
¡ 4¹p ¸ 0, one can obtain the steady
state equilibrium.4)
4) Assuming steady state n = nt = nt+1, one can obtain n
2¡®½

1 + ¹p1+r

n+®½¹p =
0. Then, n =
®½(1+ ¹p1+r )§
r
®2½2(1+ ¹p1+r )
2¡4®½¹p
2 is obtainable if ®
2½2

1 + ¹p1+r
2
¡4®½¹p >
0.
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4 Equilibrium in Closed Economy
This section presents derivation of the fertility dynamics as the equilib-
rium in the closed economy. In a closed economy, capital accumulation is
considered. Capital accumulation is found by the capital market equilib-
rium. The capital market equilibrium is shown as
ntkt+1 = (1¡ ¿t)wt ¡ c1t ¡ ztnt: (15)
For this section, we assume At = a
Kt
Lt
as the externality of capital accu-
mulation, similarly to Romer (1986), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) and
others. Then, the wage rate (7) and the interest rate (8) are given as shown
below:
wt = (af(a)¡ f 0(a))kt; (16)
1 + rt = f
0(a): (17)
In this section, f(a) = Yt
AtLt
and kt =
Kt
Lt
are de¯ned.
4.1 DC Case
With (5), (10), (11), (15), (16), and (17), we can obtain the following
capital accumulation equation and the fertility in DC as
kt+1
kt
=

1¡ ¹¿
nt
¡ ®+ ¯
®½

(af(a)¡ f 0(a)); (18)
nt =
®½(1¡ ¹¿)
1¡ ®½¹¿
kt+1
kt
f 0(a)
: (19)
De¯ning 1 + g = kt+1
kt
, the following equations can be obtained.
1 + g =
(1¡®¡¯)(af(a)¡f 0(a))
®½
1 + ¹¿(af(a)¡f
0(a))
f 0(a)
; (20)
n=
®½(1¡ ¹¿)
1¡ ¹¿(1¡®¡¯)(af(a)¡f 0(a))
f 0(a)+¹¿(af(a)¡f 0(a))
: (21)
An increase in contribution rate ¹¿ reduces the income growth rate because
the pension reduces the incentive to save for the old period. However,
the fertility can be pulled up by the pension. This e®ect is shown by
¹¿(1¡®¡¯)(af(a)¡f 0(a))
f 0(a)+¹¿(af(a)¡f 0(a)) in the denominator.
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4.2 DB Case
With (5), (10), (12), (15), (16), and (17), we can obtain the following
income growth and the fertility in the DB case,
1 + gt =
 
1¡ ¹p
nt¡1
nt
¡ ®+ ¯
®½
!
(af(a)¡ f 0(a)); (22)
nt = ®½
 
1¡ ¹p
nt¡1
+
¹p(af(a)¡ f 0(a))
f 0(a)
 
1¡ ¹p
nt¡1
nt
¡ ®+ ¯
®½
!!
: (23)
With (23), nt depends on nt¡1 as
nt =

1¡ ¹p
nt¡1

®½¡ ¹p(af(a)¡f 0(a))(®+¯)
f 0(a) +
p
D
2
; (24)
whereD=

1¡ ¹p
nt¡1

®½¡ ¹p(af(a)¡f 0(a))(®+¯)
f 0(a)
2
+ 4®½¹p(af(a)¡f
0(a))
f 0(a)

1¡ ¹p
nt¡1

.
The dynamics of nt is the same with Fig. 1. Therefore, we can obtain a
stable and unstable steady state.
If fertility continues decreasing, the income growth rate decreases too
because of the high contribution rate. Similarly to the DC case, an increase
in the pension level decreases the income growth rate. For an increased
pension level, the e®ect on fertility is ambiguous.
Then, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition If the pension is provided as DB, then fertility and income
growth show dynamics. Such is not true in a DC case. With low initial
fertility, both income growth and the fertility continue to decrease.
This proposition presents an important policy implication. In Japan,
the population size of the working generation continues to decrease. With
a DB pension, both the income growth rate and the fertility rate are ex-
pected to be reduced in the future. Therefore, a change from DB to DC
is necessary. By virtue of this reform, the income growth rate and fertility
can be maintained at a constant level.
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5 Conclusions
This paper sets the endogenous fertility model with a pay-as-you-go pen-
sion and examines how the pension system a®ects fertility. If the household
can use child care services, then the DC pension gives no dynamics of fertil-
ity. This result is obtainable in the model not only of a small open economy
but also of a closed economy.
By contrast, the DB pension brings about dynamics of fertility. With low
fertility, the DB pension negatively in°uences fertility over time. Income
growth continues decreasing, too. This paper demonstrates that a pension
reform that ¯xes the contribution rate of a pension should be considered:
The burden for younger people is not expected to be increased. However,
older people are adversely in°uenced by the pension reform.
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